Hackers, insurers, executives and government officials unite behind bold strategy of blaming whichever person clicked the email
LONDON — By Ingrid Falk (The London Prat). A dramatic rise in ransomware attacks has reopened the global debate over whether businesses should pay hackers, refuse payment, or simply transfer the entire company to criminals and ask them to improve quarterly performance. According to the Financial Times report on the ransomware payment debate, confirmed victims rose 389 per cent in 2025, from roughly 1,600 to 7,831 worldwide. Meanwhile, the UK National Cyber Security Centre's ransomware guidance, the US government's StopRansomware resources, and the FBI's explanation of ransomware threats recommend preparation, reporting, and strong security — three activities traditionally postponed until six minutes after every computer displays a skull wearing sunglasses.
The ransomware industry now consists of several highly specialised participants.
Hackers break into the network. Executives announce that the incident is "limited in scope." Public relations officers explain that "limited" includes every customer since 1997. Insurance companies search the policy for an exclusion covering electricity, computers, criminals, or Tuesdays. Government officials recommend not paying. Cybersecurity consultants recommend a twelve-month resilience transformation programme costing approximately three ransoms.
Everyone agrees the system is unacceptable, although each participant has found a remarkably acceptable way to make money from it.
Ransomware gangs expressed frustration that modern companies remain poorly prepared for attacks despite spending years attending seminars titled Building Tomorrow's Secure Digital Future Today.
"We encrypted their entire network using a password stolen from an employee whose password was 'Password2026!'" said a hacker identifying himself only as Boris_Official_Real. "Frankly, we expected more resistance. At one point we thought it might be a trap, but then we saw their chief financial officer had administrator privileges."
Cybercriminals insist they are not merely extortionists but "unauthorised digital transformation partners."
Traditional consultants ask a company what its systems do, hold eighteen workshops, and submit a PowerPoint presentation. Hackers discover what the systems do in forty minutes, shut them down, and leave a note containing a Bitcoin address.
The efficiency gap has become embarrassing.
One ransomware negotiator said criminals increasingly offer better customer service than legitimate technology vendors.
"The hacker answers within five minutes," he explained. "Microsoft says someone will contact you during the next available geological period."
Some ransomware groups now operate help desks, payment portals, and live chat systems. Victims can obtain technical assistance at any hour, provided the technical issue is that the criminals have destroyed everything.
Corporate boards responded to the crisis by demanding stronger protection, clearer accountability, and confirmation that none of those things would reduce executive bonuses.
Before an attack, cybersecurity is described as a cost centre.
After an attack, it becomes the company's "highest strategic priority."
Three weeks later, once the chief executive has appeared on television wearing a solemn expression and an open-collared shirt, cybersecurity returns to being a cost centre.
A survey conducted by the Institute for Things Everyone Already Knew found that 94 per cent of executives believe cyber resilience is essential, while 91 per cent would prefer to fund a lobby refurbishment featuring a living wall.
"We take the protection of customer data extremely seriously," said one chief executive whose company had stored 12 million medical records in a folder labelled "Miscellaneous."
The company later clarified that it had taken the data seriously enough to collect it, monetise it, duplicate it across seven vendors, and retain it decades beyond any useful purpose.
Unfortunately, it had not taken it seriously enough to protect it.
Senior management blamed a "sophisticated threat actor," the corporate phrase for someone who correctly guessed that the managing director's password was the name of his Labrador.
Workers have also been drafted into the cyberwar through annual security training videos featuring actors who have never received an email from an actual workplace.
Employees are instructed to examine spelling, suspicious links, and unusual requests. This becomes difficult when ordinary management emails already contain spelling mistakes, suspicious links, and unusual requests.
A genuine company message might read: "URGENT: Kindly validate payroll credentials through new portal before 4PM or salary processing may fail."
A criminal message might read exactly the same thing, but with fewer meetings attached.
Security departments tell employees not to click unfamiliar links while the company sends twelve unfamiliar links each morning through five separate human resources platforms.
Workers are also warned against opening unexpected attachments, despite entire organisations operating through unexpected attachments called "FINAL_v7_REVISED_USE_THIS_ONE_2.xlsx."
One eyewitness described the moment a colleague clicked a malicious file.
"He asked whether it was safe," she said. "IT told him to submit a ticket. The ticket system was already encrypted."
The employee was later required to complete remedial training from home because the office computers no longer recognised the concept of home, office, or computers.
The central policy dispute concerns whether ransom payments should be banned.
Supporters of prohibition argue that payments fund criminal enterprises and encourage further attacks. This is logically compelling. Feeding pigeons attracts pigeons. Feeding cybercriminals attracts cybercriminals with investor relations departments.
Critics note that banning payments can leave hospitals, utilities, and essential services unable to recover critical systems. This is also logically compelling, particularly when the encrypted computer controls chemotherapy appointments rather than the office fantasy football league.
The UK is moving toward restrictions preventing public-sector bodies and critical infrastructure operators from paying ransoms, while opponents warn that inflexible bans may worsen emergencies and redirect attackers toward private companies. Nearly half of targeted businesses reportedly pay, illustrating how quickly moral certainty changes once payroll, production, and patient records disappear simultaneously.
Government policy therefore resembles a parent telling children never to negotiate with kidnappers before quietly asking what denomination of banknotes the kidnappers prefer.
Officials advise organisations to maintain secure backups, segment networks, patch software, and practise recovery procedures.
Companies welcome this advice and promise to implement it immediately after completing the digital modernisation project that began in 2014.
Insurance companies have entered the debate with the confidence of organisations that know every crisis contains a deductible.
Cyber insurance policies may cover business interruption, legal costs, and incident response, although exclusions can leave victims uncertain whether the most damaging losses will actually be reimbursed. US data cited by the Financial Times indicates that 75 per cent of cyber claims were closed without payment in 2024, while global cyber premiums reached an estimated $15.6 billion in 2025.
This means the insurance system is performing beautifully, provided the objective is collecting insurance premiums.
One broker explained that businesses should carefully review their policies.
"Cyber insurance covers cyber events," he said, "except events involving crime, war, negligence, third-party software, outdated systems, unpatched systems, insider activity, external activity, electricity, or computers."
Asked what remained covered, he pointed to a complimentary telephone consultation.
Insurers also worry that banning ransom payments could distort the market and increase premiums.
This concern has touched the public deeply. Across Britain, ordinary citizens have reportedly paused during breakfast to wonder whether insurers are receiving adequate margins from extortion emergencies.
Consultants say the solution is improved cyber hygiene, better identity controls, network visibility, tested backups, and continuous monitoring.
They are correct.
They are also available to explain this through a 148-page report featuring a diagram of three overlapping circles labelled "People," "Process," and "Technology."
A consultant's principal skill is translating "update your software" into "establish a forward-looking patch-governance ecosystem aligned with enterprise risk appetite."
The invoice is then encrypted for security.
Industry experts recommend subsidised backup infrastructure and tax incentives for cybersecurity investments. This could help smaller organisations that lack the resources to defend themselves against industrialised criminal networks.
It could also create a new government programme under which businesses submit 46 forms proving they need assistance because criminals have encrypted the folder containing the forms.
Technology vendors have reminded customers that security is a shared responsibility.
The vendor is responsible for selling software.
The customer is responsible for discovering what is wrong with it.
A typical corporation may depend on hundreds of external providers, cloud systems, and contractors. Each vendor promises military-grade security, a reassuring phrase because military computer projects are famous for arriving early, under budget, and without anyone emailing classified documents to themselves.
When a breach occurs, the software company blames the customer's configuration. The customer blames the software. The contractor blames a subcontractor. The subcontractor has dissolved and reopened under another name.
Responsibility travels through the supply chain faster than malware.
Ordinary customers remain the ransomware economy's unpaid supporting cast.
Their names, addresses, medical records, passwords, and financial details may be stolen, but they are comforted with free identity monitoring.
This is equivalent to losing your front door and receiving a complimentary telescope.
Customers are told to watch for suspicious activity, change their passwords, and remain vigilant. Companies seldom explain how one remains vigilant against a criminal possessing one's date of birth, passport number, and complete dental history.
"We regret any inconvenience," the breach notification begins.
"Inconvenience" is a versatile corporate word covering delayed trains, missing luggage, and the possibility that a teenager in another country now possesses enough personal information to apply for your mortgage.
Ransomware succeeds because every participant behaves rationally within a collectively ridiculous system.
Hackers attack because payment is profitable.
Companies pay because downtime is expensive.
Insurers insure because fear sells policies.
Consultants advise because confusion sells consulting.
Governments discourage payment because crime should not pay, while avoiding absolute bans because occasionally crime possesses the only functioning decryption key.
Customers receive apologies because apologies remain cheaper than secure infrastructure.
The result is ransomware-as-a-service, cybersecurity-as-a-service, insurance-as-a-service, and public concern as a permanently renewable resource.
The most effective defence remains boring: maintained backups, restricted access, multifactor authentication, network segmentation, timely patching, rehearsed recovery plans, and employees empowered to report mistakes quickly. These measures lack the glamour of artificial intelligence, blockchain, or a chief cyber visionary wearing trainers with a suit, which is precisely why many organisations neglect them. Official guidance consistently stresses preparation, reporting, and recovery planning rather than assuming payment will restore data.
Civilisation has connected every hospital, bank, government department, factory, and refrigerator to the internet. It then secured the resulting network using passwords chosen by people who become angry when required to include a capital letter.
The criminals may be immoral.
They are not confused about the business model.
This report concerns genuine ransomware risks, real policy disputes, and authentic institutional incompetence, lightly marinated in exaggeration. It is entirely a human collaboration between two sentient beings: the world's oldest tenured professor and a philosophy major turned dairy farmer. No computer systems were encrypted during production, although one printer remains under investigation.
For the American accent on the same racket, our cousins file from Bohiney.com.
Auf Wiedersehen, amigo!